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91 
Investigating the Potentials of  
Restorative Justice Practice 
Lode Walgrave  
This Article draws its conclusions from available evaluation 
research on restorative justice practices. However, to understand 
thoroughly the scope of this research, two preliminary comments 
must set the scene—the socio-ethical foundation of restorative justice 
and its lack of a clear definition. 
AWARENESS OF SOCIO-ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
The option for restorative justice is not an instrumental choice. It 
is rooted primarily in socio-ethical intuitions. Aimed at restoration 
instead of acceptance of the punitive premise and giving space for 
deliberation processes among stakeholders instead of imposing a top-
down decision procedure, indeed, it is grounded in different views on 
human relations and social institutions. It is believed that restorative 
justice practices are ―better,‖ ―more constructive,‖ or ―more just‖ 
than the a priori option for punishment and formalism in the current 
criminal justice system.
1
 Often, however, these beliefs are not well 
elaborated; the socio-ethical plus value seems to be considered 
evidence. Yet, the lack of extension on ethical foundations is 
problematic. If socio-ethical beliefs are not made explicit and 
distinguished clearly from observations in practice, evaluation 
research may be blurred.
2
 Hence, while exploring the socio-ethical 
roots of restorative justice is not the subject of this Article, it is 
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 1. See HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 3–5 (2002). 
 2. LODE WALGRAVE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, SELF-INTEREST AND RESPONSIBLE 
CITIZENSHIP 2–3 (2008). 
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important to be aware of them to understand the status of evaluation 
research on restorative justice practices. 
As will be made clear later in this Article, criteria for measuring 
restorative justice efficiency are not the same as the criteria used to 
evaluate traditional criminal justice interventions.
3
 The instrumental 
effects of restorative justice must be considered within the particular 
socio-ethical ground that led to the restorative justice option. In fact, 
the bottom line is not that the effects of restorative justice practices 
must be clearly better than the known effects of the traditional 
criminal justice interventions but only that they may not be worse. 
Imagine if no benefits were found: the victims were not 
systematically better off, the offenders did not better understand why 
their behavior was unacceptable, they continued to reoffend as 
before, or both, and no advantages were observed for community life 
or public safety. If the effectiveness of restorative justice were 
exactly the same as that of punitive justice, the preference for 
restorative justice would hold out. Unless its outcomes were 
significantly worse for the victim, the offender, or public safety, 
restorative justice advocates would stick to their option for restorative 
justice.  
But still, evaluation research on restorative justice practice is 
needed. Brilliant ideas may indeed turn out badly in practice. That is 
why systematic checks must be carried out to find out what 
restorative justice brings about in reality. Currently, restorative 
justice practices are being implemented for an increasingly broad 
range of crimes, including the most serious ones, all over the world.
4
 
A growing number of countries and states have legislation that favors 
responses with a view to reparation.
5
 International organizations have 
recently issued statements and recommendations endorsing a 
 
 3. See infra notes 39–46 and accompanying text. 
 4. Mark S. Umbreit, William Bradshaw & Robert B. Coates, Victims of Severe Violence 
in Dialogue with the Offender: Key Principles, Practices, Outcomes and Implications, in 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN CONTEXT: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND DIRECTIONS 123 (Elmar 
G.M. Weitekamp & Hans-Jürgen Kerner eds., 2003). 
 5. Paul McCold, The Recent History of Restorative Justice: Mediation, Circles and 
Conferencing, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 23, 35–41 (Dennis Sullivan & Larry 
Tifft eds., 2006); Daniel W. Van Ness, The Shape of Things to Come: A Framework for 
Thinking About a Restorative Justice System, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THEORETICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 1, 1–2 (Elmar G.M. Weitekamp & Hans-Jürgen Kerner eds., 2002). 
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restorative approach to offending.
6
 At first glance, this expansion 
alone suggests that restorative justice practices are indeed a feasible 
response to crime, and that they are attractive to an increasing 
proportion of the general population, justice officials, and policy-
makers. On its own, this is an important indication, but it is not 
sufficient to conclude that restorative justice is a good option. 
Deeper, more nuanced, and more systematic exploration of 
restorative justice practice is necessary. 
SEARCHING FOR CLARITY ON RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
Surveying the empirical assessments of restorative justice, one is 
confronted with a lack of clarity in the concept of restorative justice. 
Yet, clarity is badly needed for evaluation research.
7
 If the object of 
the investigation is not well delimited, one cannot investigate it 
accurately. Without transparent differentiation between socio-ethical 
options and empirical findings, the assessments lose credibility. If the 
relationship between the mainstream punitive apriorism and 
restorative justice is not understood unambiguously, the two cannot 
be compared adequately. If there is no view on the variety and 
complexity of possible restorative justice practices, conclusions based 
on one type of practice cannot address restorative justice as a whole. 
If there is no clarity about the objectives of restorative justice, its 
success or failure cannot be assessed. 
Currently, restorative justice is a complex and lively realm of 
different—and partially opposing—beliefs and options, renovating 
inspirations and practices in different contexts, and scientific 
―crossing swords‖ over research methodology and outcomes. 
Restorative justice is, at the same time, a social movement with 
different degrees of self-criticism and a domain of scientific research 
with different degrees of methodological adequacy. It is a field of its 
own, looking for constructive ways of addressing the aftermath of 
crime but also part of a larger socio-ethical and political agenda. 
 
 6. McCold, supra note 5, at 35. 
 7. WALGRAVE, supra note 2, at 2; Inge Vanfraechem & Ivo Aertsen, Empirical Research 
on Restorative Justice in Europe: A Challenge, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE REALITIES: 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT 267 (Inge Vanfraechem, Ivo Aertsen & Jolien 
Willemsens eds., 2010).  
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Many interconnected tendencies have influenced the re-
emergence of restorative justice, such as feminism, deincarceration 
movements, indigenous peoples’ emancipation movements, and 
options for reconfirming the responsibility of (young) offenders.
8
 
Probably, the most important roots are victims’ movements, 
communitarianism, and critical criminology.
9
 
Practices have evolved since the early 1970s in the United States, 
Canada, and Europe.
10
 Originally, a number of isolated initiatives did 
not refer at all to a restorative justice concept.
11
 It is only since the 
late 1980s and early 1990s that they have led to a realm of practices, 
social movements, theory-formation, ethical reflection and empirical 
research, which is now referred to as ―restorative justice.‖12 The 
application of its principles is spreading far beyond criminal matters, 
penetrating the regulation of disputes and discipline problems in 
schools, neighborhood conflicts, child welfare and protection matters, 
labor and business regulation, and even the resolution of conflicts 
involving systemic political violence. 
Given its diverse roots, broad field of implementation, and current 
variety of forms, it is not surprising that restorative justice does not 
appear as a clearly defined set of thoughts and implementations but 
rather as a confused, seemingly even incoherent, assembly. Adding to 
the confusion are apparently similar movements, under banners such 
as transformative justice, relational justice, community justice, 
peacemaking justice, and the like.
13
 Different and even competing 
visions on restorative justice are presented in the literature.
14
 
Johnstone and Van Ness present restorative justice as a ―deeply 
 
 8. DANIEL VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 12–19 (3d ed. 2006). 
 9. JACQUES FAGET, LA MÉDIATION: ESSAI DE POLITIQUE PÉNALE 23 (1997); VAN NESS 
& STRONG, supra note 8, at 43–47. 
 10. McCold, supra note 5; Christa Pelikan & Thomas Trenczek, Victim Offender 
Mediation and Restorative Justice: The European Landscape, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 63, 63. 
 11. McCold, supra note 5, at 24. 
 12. See id.; VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 8, at 34–35. 
 13. VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 8, at 23. 
 14. Jim Dignan, Restorative Justice and the Law: The Case for an Integrated, Systemic 
Approach, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LAW 168 (Lode Walgrave ed., 2002); Paul 
McCold, Restorative Justice: Variations on a Theme, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: 
POTENTIALITIES, RISKS AND PROBLEMS 19 (Lode Walgrave ed., 1998). 
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contested‖ concept, subject to debate and differences in approaches.15 
As a consequence, seeking consensus on one single definition seems 
to be an impossible mission. 
The discussion of how to understand restorative justice is 
dominated by the opposition between a process-based versus an 
outcome-based view. A majority of restorative justice advocates 
would prefer the process-based approach, as reflected in McCold’s 
statement: ―The essence of restorative justice is not the end, but the 
means by which resolution is achieved.‖16 The hallmark of restorative 
justice is indeed the attempt to bring victims and offenders together 
in an inclusive encounter aiming at a consensual resolution of the 
prejudices caused by a crime. However, restorative justice cannot be 
reduced to such process, for two reasons. 
First, no process can be defined or evaluated without referring to 
its purpose. A deliberative process is valued in restorative justice, not 
because of the deliberation on its own, but because it facilitates 
mutual understanding and expressions of remorse, compassion, 
apology, and forgiveness, which may lead to reparative agreements 
and feelings of respect, peace, and satisfaction.
17
 These feelings also 
are outcomes. Processes that do not seek to contribute to the 
reparation of the crime-caused harm are not part of restorative justice. 
Conversely, a sanction imposed in order to partially repair a victim’s 
harm and feelings of safety in the community may in some 
circumstances be considered in a restorative justice perspective.  
Second, restricting restorative justice to voluntary deliberations 
would drastically limit its scope and doom it to stay at the margins of 
the system.
18
 The mainstream response to crime would remain 
coercive and punitive. The criminal justice system would act as the 
gatekeeper and probably be very selective in its referrals to 
deliberative restorative processes.  
 
 15. Gerry Johnstone & Daniel Van Ness, The Meaning of Restorative Justice, in 
HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Gerry Johnstone & Daniel Van Ness eds., 2007). 
 16. Paul McCold, Paradigm Muddle: The Threat to Restorative Justice Posed by Its 
Merger with Community Justice, 7 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 13, 15 (2004). 
 17. See Inge Vanfraechem, Community, Society and State in Restorative Justice: An 
Exploration, in IMAGES OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE THEORY 73, 76 (Robert Mackay et al. eds., 
2007). 
 18. Dignan, supra note 14, at 172. 
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Restoration must be seen as the goal, and voluntary processes as 
tools, though vital ones. The focus on the outcome allows for a 
maximalist version of restorative justice.
19
 A maximalist version of 
restorative justice includes all actions to achieve partial repair. 
Deliberative processes hold the highest potential for achieving 
restoration, but if voluntary agreements cannot be reached, a 
maximalist approach on restorative justice must be taken.
20
 It may 
include coercive obligations in pursuit of partial reparation, such as 
formal restitution or compensation, fines or working for the benefit of 
a victims’ fund, and community service.21 Generally, they are 
imposed by a justice system that should also be oriented primarily 
towards imposing reparative sanctions instead of punishments.
22
 Of 
course, such sanctions do not achieve the full potential of the 
restorative paradigm, but restorative justice is not a simple black-and-
white option. It can be achieved to different degrees.
23
 And achieving 
partial reparation is better than achieving no reparation at all. 
In this Article, I consider restorative justice as ―an option for 
doing justice after the occurrence of an offence that is primarily 
oriented towards repairing the individual, relational and social harm 
caused by that offence.‖24 Restorative justice is not a limited set of 
actions or programs but an option that may inspire to different 
degrees a variety of initiatives, programs and systems. ―Restorative 
justice is a compass, not a map.‖25 The key element is the goal of 
repairing the crime-caused harm. All options and actions that aim at 
correcting such harm can be included in the restorative justice 
concept. All options and actions that do not address these harms are 
not considered restorative justice, though they may be very 
respectable and worthwhile. 
 
 19. WALGRAVE, supra note 2, at 23. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 107–08. 
 22. Id. at 107. 
 23. Van Ness, supra note 5, at 1, 6–13; ZEHR, supra note 1, at 54–57. 
 24. WALGRAVE, supra note 2, at 21. 
 25. ZEHR, supra note 1, at 10. 
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EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PRACTICE 
Regular consultation of several websites on restorative justice and 
restorative practices reveals an almost daily increase in empirical 
assessments.
26
 The scope is very diverse. They range from small local 
tests to broad national projects or international comparative surveys; 
some just describe a restorative justice program, others present a 
quasi-experimental design to find out the impact of restorative justice 
practices; some address restorative justice as a whole, others focus on 
certain aspects, such as victim participation, community involvement, 
or offender rehabilitation.
27
 It is not easy to draw a straight line 
through the available package. Today’s conclusions are likely to be 
out of date tomorrow. The following brief survey is based mainly on 
several high-quality surveys and meta-analyses, with a particular 
focus on victim–offender mediation and conferencing.28 Most 
mention serious methodological shortcomings and lack of theoretical 
depth. McCold concludes that ―research on restorative justice 
practice today is a mile wide, but only an inch deep.‖29 
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
Research evaluating human interventions is always precarious. 
This is true not only of research on restorative justice practices but 
 
 26. See, e.g., PFI Ctr. for Justice & Reconciliation, Evaluation Reports, RESTORATIVE 
JUST. ONLINE, http://www.restorativejustice.org/programme-place/07evaluation/reports (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2011); Research Annotated Bibliography, CENTER FOR RESTORATIVE JUST. & 
PEACEMAKING, http://www.cehd.umn.edu/ssw/rjp/Resources/Research_Annotated_Bibliography 
/AB_Author.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2011); Documents Index, CENTER FOR PEACEMAKING & 
CONFLICT STUD., http://peace.fresno.edu/docs/ (last modified May 10, 2010). 
 27. Id. 
 28. JEFF LATIMER, CRAIG DOWDEN & DANIELLE MUISE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE CAN., THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PRACTICES: A META ANALYSIS (2001); LAWRENCE 
W. SHERMAN & HEATHER STRANG, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THE EVIDENCE (2007); James 
Bonta et al., Restorative Justice and Recidivism: Promises Made, Promises Kept?, in 
HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 108; Anne Lemonne & Ida Hydle, The 
Evaluation of Restorative Justice: Lessons to Be Learned from a Data Collection of Evaluative 
Programmes in Europe, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE REALITIES: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN A 
EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 7, at 11; Paul McCold, A Survey of Assessment Research on 
Mediation and Conferencing, in REPOSITIONING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 67 (Lode Walgrave ed., 
2003). 
 29. McCold, supra note 28, at 106. 
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also for evaluations of traditional punishment, prevention, and 
treatment programs. The meta-analyses in the ―what works‖ research 
tradition, for example, list a number of methodological shortcomings 
in many evaluations,
30
 including unclear indication of measurable 
program objectives, invalid instruments, absence of or inadequate 
control groups, doubtful external validity, problematic measurement 
of reoffending, overoptimistic interpretations by committed believers, 
and lack of attention to undesirable side effects. In general, 
overconfidence in ―evidence-based‖ work may be naïve.31 That also 
applies to evaluation of restorative justice programs. But evaluation 
of restorative justice is also confronted with a few particular 
challenges.
32
 
Feasibility 
As most typical restorative justice practices depend on voluntary 
participation of the stakeholders, the first question is whether such 
practices can be achieved. The feasibility question is irrelevant in the 
imposition of traditional criminal justice interventions. The question 
is seldom asked in treatment programs, where those who refuse 
treatment are simply not counted in. Moreover, the feasibility 
question is less complicated in traditional intervention programs, 
because only the offender is concerned; in restorative justice 
processes one of the most difficult issues is bringing together two 
parties—victims and offenders—who are assumed to have opposing 
views and interests. 
 
 30. D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT 91–98 
(2003). 
 31. See generally Adam Crawford, The Governance of Urban Safety and the Politics of 
Insecurity, in URBAN SAFETY: PROBLEMS, GOVERNANCE AND STRATEGIES 65 (Kees van der 
Vijver & Jan Terpstra eds., 2004); Lode Walgrave, Criminology as I See It Ideally, Address 
Before the European Society of Criminology European Criminology Award, Edinburgh (Sept. 
5, 2008), in CRIMINOLOGY IN EUROPE (Eur. Soc’y of Criminology, Amsterdam, Neth.), Nov. 
2008, at 3. 
 32. See Gordon Bazemore & Lori Elis, Evaluation of Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK 
OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 395; Hennessey Hayes, Reoffending and 
Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 428–30; 
McCold, supra note 28, at 74–75. 
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Quality 
As with prevention and treatment programs, the quality of 
restorative justice processes varies greatly.
33
 There are brilliant 
performers and awful bunglers. Several methodological options have 
different potential for distinct kinds of cases. Various models—direct 
and shuttle mediation;
34
 Family Group Conferencing according to the 
New Zealand model;
35
 the Wagga-Wagga-model or the Real Justice 
model of conferencing;
36
 conferences led by police or by civil 
facilitators
37—are methodologically dissimilar, each with particular 
potential and risks. Probably a large part of the observed differences 
in results is due to such variations. So far, these variations have been 
explored insufficiently. Therefore, evaluations cannot just address 
―the‖ restorative justice practice but must indicate precisely which 
type of process is explored; they must also include accurate process 
descriptions and evaluations based on clear conceptions of what a 
good restorative justice process should be.
38
 
Criteria for Evaluation 
One challenge is defining evaluation criteria. Traditional criminal 
justice or treatment interventions aim at the offender. Hence, their 
standard for success is easy to define, even if not always easy to 
measure accurately: reoffending must decrease.
39
 But as restorative 
 
 33. See generally sources cited supra note 28 for variety of existing studies. 
 34. See Shuttle Mediation, SAFEGUARDING COMMUNITIES—RESOLVING CONFLICT, 
http://www.scmc.sacro.org.uk/SCMC_12_ShuttleMediation.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2011) 
(describing shuttle mediation). 
 35. See infra note 75. 
 36. See David B. Moore & Terry A. O’Connell, Family Conferencing in Wagga Wagga: 
A Communitarian Model of Justice, in FAMILY CONFERENCING AND JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE 
WAY FORWARD OR MISPLACED OPTIMISM? 44 (Christine Wundersitz & Joy Alder eds., 1994), 
available at http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/9/2/F/%7B92F860FB-8CF5-4D3B-81F9-2B4C 
9046767D%7Dch3.pdf. 
 37. Police as Restorative Justice Facilitators, RESTORATIVE JUST. ONLINE, http://www 
.restorativejustice.org/police/2police-as-restorative-justice-facilitators (last visited Apr. 16, 
2011) (listing studies of conferences led by police facilitators). 
 38. Nathan Harris, Evaluating the Practice of Restorative Justice: The Case of Family 
Group Conferencing, in REPOSITIONING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 121, 129–31. 
 39. See, e.g., WHAT WORKS: REDUCING REOFFENDING: GUIDELINES FROM RESEARCH 
AND PRACTICE (James McGuire ed., 1995) (providing studies and results that show what works 
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justice does not aim primarily at the offender but instead at the harm 
to be repaired, the first standard of success cannot target the offender 
and his reoffending; it must indicate the degree of reparation of harm, 
suffering, and social unrest. Material compensation is only a part. 
How do you measure psychological, relational, or social restoration? 
Some authors have suggested indicators such as decreasing Post 
Traumatic Stress Syndrome in victims to show the degree to which 
victims have recovered from their victimization.
40
 
Satisfaction of the participants is one of the most researched 
variables in assessments of restorative justice.
41
 While this may seem 
too superficial and general a concept, it is an important one.
42
 
Because restorative processes put the decision of how to repair the 
harm in the hands of the direct stakeholders, it is logical to look for 
subjective criteria that express their feelings. Satisfaction means that 
the participants accept the conference or mediation and its outcome. 
It does not mean that they are completely happy or enthusiastic. 
Satisfaction is to be understood in relation to what they expected.
43
 
Sometimes, satisfaction is a kind of relief, because the event went 
better than they feared. Moreover, satisfaction is a container concept 
that covers a broad range of feelings and subjective evaluations—
whether the victimization is taken seriously, the victims are listened 
to respectfully, their own opinion is taken into account, ―procedural 
justice‖44 occurs, and the offender has apologized sincerely.45 Many 
projects investigate such elements separately. 
Apart from satisfaction and its components as indications of 
subjective contentment, external checks are needed. The juridical 
quality of the process is investigated insufficiently; more research is 
needed on due process rights and the proportionality of the reparative 
 
for reducing reoffending). 
 40. SHERMAN & STRANG, supra note 28, at 88. 
 41. See id. at 25. 
 42. Daniel Van Ness & Mara Schiff, Satisfaction Guaranteed? The Meaning of 
Satisfaction in Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE, REPAIRING HARM 
AND TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES 47, 49–51 (Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff eds., 2001). 
 43. Id. 
 44. TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 6 (2006). 
 45. Mara Schiff, Satisfying the Needs and Interests of Stakeholders, in HANDBOOK OF 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 228, 233. 
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effort in relation to the seriousness of harm.
46
 Also reoffending is an 
external criterion. Influencing the offender is a derivative effect of 
the primary objective to repair, but it must be researched. If 
reoffending increased, the additional harm to peace and safety in the 
community would be contrary to the pursued restoration. Moreover, 
increased reoffending after restorative processes would be 
detrimental to the public and political acceptance of restorative 
justice. 
Phases and Levels 
Restorative justice ambitions (or pretentions) are broad and 
numerous. Bazemore and Schiff distinguish immediate outcomes, 
intermediate outcomes, and long-term outcomes.
47
 In fact, four 
evaluation phases can be distinguished: (1) the quality of the process 
itself (respect for rights, mutual respect of stakeholders, 
empowerment, participation); (2) the feelings immediately after the 
process (procedural justice, satisfaction, mutual image of victims and 
offenders); (3) the execution of the reparative plan (carried out 
correctly or not, feeling of ―being restored‖ in the victim, self image 
and prospects of the offender); and (4) on longer term (reoffending, 
experiences in victims). 
Not all criteria are equally important. Distinctions exist between 
indispensible preconditions (respect for human rights), hard core 
reparation (assessable reparation or compensation of concrete 
damage and suffering), wider restorative effects (subjective feelings 
of peace, reintegration of victim and offender, feelings of safety in 
local community) and impact on wider community and institutional 
level (growing confidence in restorative justice dealing with 
offending, and the extension of restorative model of conflict 
resolution towards other fields of social life). 
 
 46. Lode Walgrave, Restorative Justice and the Law: Socio-Ethical and Juridical 
Foundations for a Systematic Approach, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LAW, supra note 
14, at 191, 216. 
 47. GORDON BAZEMORE & MARA SCHIFF, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM AND RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE: BUILDING THEORY AND POLICY FROM PRACTICE 45–46 (2005). 
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Comparison 
All success is relative. The value of restorative justice processes 
can be gauged only in comparison with other models of intervention. 
Criminological research clearly shows that routine application of 
punishment does not present good effects. Meta analyses of 
prevention and treatment programs show that many do not work but 
that certain projects, under some conditions, may have some positive 
impact on some potential offenders. The question now is whether 
restorative justice can offer other and more positive results. The 
composition of adequate control groups is necessary. That is a 
problem in all evaluative research, but restorative justice projects face 
an additional problem.
48
 As typical restorative justice interventions 
rely on voluntary participation, the group is hard to compare with a 
control group of victims and offenders involved in a traditional penal 
procedure, where voluntariness is far away. Moreover, the traditional 
system is currently the gatekeeper for referral to restorative justice 
projects, based on uninformed intuitions.
49
 The referrals are mostly a 
selection of benign cases which are easier to resolve.
50
 Some surveys 
of evaluation projects based on random assignment deliver more 
accurate data,
51
 but they cannot resolve the problem completely.
52
  
These problems and the lack of theoretical framework make it 
difficult to set up methodologically sound research that focuses 
accurately on the crucial elements or dynamics that really are key to 
being restorative and that may make a difference in attaining the 
different objectives at different levels. The question whether 
―restorative justice works or not‖ must be specified much more, 
because it cannot be answered satisfactorily in its bluntness. Yet, 
despite these challenges, some provisional conclusions can be 
derived from the available research. 
 
 48. See JAMES DIGNAN, UNDERSTANDING VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 138 
(2005). 
 49. See VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 8, at 153–57; ZEHR, supra note 1, at 46–47. 
 50. Dieter Dölling & Arthur Hartmann, Reoffending After Victim-Offender Mediation in 
Juvenile Court Proceedings, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN CONTEXT: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE 
AND DIRECTIONS, supra note 4, at 208, 212–13. 
 51. See, e.g., LATIMER, DOWDEN & MUISE, supra note 28; SHERMAN & STRANG, supra 
note 28. 
 52. WALGRAVE, supra note 2. 
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FEASIBILITY OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROCESSES 
The first empirical question is whether restorative justice 
processes are feasible. Skeptics do not believe that it would be 
feasible to set up voluntary meetings between victim and offender as 
the mainstream. They expect that it will be possible only for a 
minority of cases, addressing mostly benign offenses, often involving 
acquaintances. That can be checked. 
Several levels of selection exist. Not all offences registered by the 
criminal justice system are referred to restorative processes.
53
 A 
system selection is caused by the referring agencies such as police, 
public prosecutors’ offices, and courts.54 They screen out cases that 
they consider—rightly or not—inappropriate for restorative justice. 
In the majority of programs, for example, serious cases are not 
referred, because it is believed that those who commit severe crime 
are not approachable with such programs and that ―no risk‖ can be 
taken.
55
 
An agency selection may occur if the program uses certain criteria 
for acceptance, as most agencies do. Their offer to set up meetings is 
limited to, for example, minors or less serious offenses. Moreover, 
the agency may interrupt the preparatory phase, because the 
facilitator concludes that his offer or capacities do not match the case. 
Participation in restorative justice processes is—at least in 
principle—voluntary. Of course, voluntariness is not a clear cut 
criterion. Willingness to join in the mediation or conference is 
influenced positively or negatively by social pressure, threat of being 
referred to court, and the quality of the invitation among other 
elements.
56
 Yet, several reasons may bring invited stakeholders to 
decline participation. Stakeholder selection happens when the 
offender refuses participation because he does not see any benefits in 
it, or when the victim rejects being involved for practical, emotional, 
or punitive reasons. 
 
 53. See Dignan, supra note 14, at 173. 
 54. See VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 8, at 153–57; ZEHR, supra note 1, at 46–47. 
 55. See ZEHR, supra note 1. 
 56. Carolyn Boyes-Watson, Reflections on the Purist and the Maximalist Models of 
Restorative Justice, 3 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 441, 443–45 (2000). 
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Moreover, not all encounters lead to successful conclusions and 
not all agreements are carried out well. McCold found that 
―[a]pproximately half of the cases referred to programmes never 
reach a hearing.‖57 The rate varies from 10 percent and more than 90 
percent, and depends on many variables, such as type of program, 
type of crime, target group, the previous relation between the victim 
and the offender, and the social context of the program.
58
 If the 
meeting takes place, the agreement rate varies from 72 and 100 
percent, and the rate of compliance with the agreement varies from 
38 and 96 percent.
59
 
For both victims and offenders participation depends on the 
perceived costs and benefits of participating.
60
 Sometimes the impact 
of the offense was too minor and the expected benefits too few.
61
 
Kirkwood found significant differences in participation and 
agreement rates between the several agencies that organized 
mediation processes—in mostly minor offences.62 The findings 
suggest that the intrinsic quality of the restorative justice process is 
crucial. This factor should be included more in all evaluations.  
All of these selection biases and differences do matter in 
evaluation research. To check the feasibility of restorative processes 
and to estimate the external validity of the empirical investigation, 
various steps in the selection must be charted. The differences 
between the groups at each selection stage reduce the scope of the 
research results. They also deeply affect possible comparisons of 
restorative justice results with those of traditional criminal justice 
interventions, where such selections do not happen.  
 
 57. McCold, supra note 28, at 89. 
 58. Id. at 84. 
 59. Id. at 90. 
 60. Steve Kirkwood, Restorative Justice Cases in Scotland: Factors Related to 
Participation, the Restorative Process, Agreement Rates and Forms of Reparation, 7 EUR. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 107, 109, 116 (2010). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 118–19. 
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VICTIMS 
Consistent with the paradigm shift, the first concern is the possible 
impact of restorative practices on victims. At first sight, it seems 
evident that restorative justice responses meet victims’ needs better 
than traditional criminal justice does. Yet, the position of the victims 
in restorative justice practice is less clear than it may seem.
63
 
While victims’ movements comprise some of the most important 
precursors of restorative justice, some victim advocates warn of 
possible negative side effects.
64
 So far, the large majority of 
restorative justice processes are implemented within or mandated by 
the justice system, which is basically offender oriented.
65
 Hence, 
there is a continuous, often inarticulate, pressure to focus on the 
offender. Genuine respect for the victim’s interests and needs may 
become subordinate.
66
 The victim’s story is then used as a 
―pedagogical means‖ to motivate the offender for treatment, rather 
than as a decisive indication to determine appropriate reparative 
actions.
67
 Or the victims may be dragged into a process that impedes 
them from fully expressing their anger about what happened. 
The opportunity offered to victims to be heard and to play a 
crucial role in the aftermath of the offense may turn into a moral 
obligation or even a duty. It may become too heavy a burden. The 
traditional judicial procedures position the victim as the one to whom 
something is due. The victim is shielded from direct responsibilities. 
Restorative processes seem to take away this relatively ―comfortable‖ 
position. Not all victims can cope with that. Risks exist for secondary 
victimization because the process may cause additional trauma and 
 
 63. Lode Walgrave, Victims in Restorative Justice, in VICTIMOLOGY, VICTIM ASSISTANCE 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES SHARED BY INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS AT THE INTER-
UNIVERSITY CENTRE OF DUBROVNIK 79 (Otmar Hagemann, Peter Schäfer & Stephanie 
Schmidt eds., 2009). 
 64. Antony Pemberton, Frans Winkel & Marc Groenhuysen, Taking Victims Seriously in 
Restorative Justice, 3 INT’L PERSP. IN VICTIMOLOGY 1, 4–14 (2007). 
 65. Marnie E. Rice, Violent Offender Research and Implications for the Criminal Justice 
System, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 414 (1997). 
 66. ANNALISE ACORN, COMPULSORY COMPASSION: A CRITIQUE OF RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE 150 (2004). 
 67. See DIGNAN, supra note 48, at 62–63; Anthony Bottoms, Some Sociological 
Reflections on Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 79, 103 
(Andrew Von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003). 
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reiterate the power inequalities that existed already between the 
victim and the offender before the crime occurred.
68
  
Surveys indicate that between 20 and 80 percent of victims are 
willing to participate in mediation or conferencing.
69
 Most programs 
report over 50 percent willingness. Participation depends partly on 
the nature and the seriousness of the offence, but surviving family 
members may also participate after murders.
70
 Victims’ participation 
rates also depend on offender characteristics.
71
 They are higher with 
juvenile offenders than with adults, lower if offenders belong to an 
ethnic minority, and higher in case of first offenders. 
Of crucial importance is the process by which the victims are 
invited. Kirkwood, for example found that victims were more 
inclined to join in if they were contacted after the offender, 
suggesting that their decision is more positive if they know already 
that the offender is willing to take responsibility and to make 
amends.
72
 
Benefits victims see in a restorative justice process are grounded 
mainly in the opportunity for communication: they want to express 
their feelings to the offender, hope to receive an explanation, and 
hope to have an impact on what should be done. Many victims also 
are motivated by a sense of public responsibility and think that the 
process may contribute to more understanding in the offender and 
less reoffending. Only a minority is especially interested in material 
reparation or compensation.
73
 Reasons mentioned for non-
participation are fear of being confronted with the offender (and his 
family), apprehension about losing control over one’s own anger, and 
unwillingness to spend more time on the case.
74
 Principled rejection 
 
 68. Carol LaPrairie, Altering Course: New Directions in Criminal Justice and 
Corrections: Sentencing Circles and Family Group Conferences, 26 AUSTRAL. & N.Z. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 78 (1995). 
 69. See, e.g., DIGNAN, supra note 48, at 144, 149 (citing participation rates of 15 and 80 
percent). 
 70. MARK S. UMBREIT ET AL., FACING THE VIOLENCE: THE PATH OF RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE AND DIALOGUE 94–95 (2003). 
 71. See McCold, supra note 28, at 87–88. 
 72. Kirkwood, supra note 60, at 117. 
 73. HEATHER STRANG, REPAIR OR REVENGE: VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 92 
(2002). 
 74. SHERMAN & STRANG, supra note 28, at 62; see also BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 
47, at 197. 
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of the restorative approach is rather seldom found. Maxwell and 
Morris found that only four percent of victims explicitly wanted a 
punitive judicial procedure.
75
 In 45 victims of serious youth crime, a 
Belgian pilot project found only one advanced reasons of principle 
for refusing to attend the conference.
76
 
Satisfaction is one of the most general and stable findings. In 
general, victims’ satisfaction rates vary between 75 and 98 percent.77 
Victims who participate in mediation or conferencing are 
significantly more satisfied than those who go through a traditional 
judicial procedure.
78
 They perceive a high degree of procedural 
justice, appreciate the communicative value of the encounters, and 
find the outcomes more just than traditional judicial sanctions.
79
 
Victims also suffer less post-traumatic stress after a conference, feel 
less fear and anger, and more sympathy for the offender.
80
 The 
majority of victims of juvenile crime believe that all victims should 
be offered an opportunity to attend a conference.
81
 
Currently, however, these findings remain very general and hide 
more nuanced and more complicated outcomes. Not all victims are 
equally satisfied. For example, victims involved in processes after 
serious crimes seem to report less satisfaction than other victims.
82
 A 
small percentage is even more distressed after the process than 
before.
83
 Still, this proportion is lower than among those who go to 
 
 75. Gabrielle Maxwell & Allison Morris, Research on Family Group Conferences with 
Young Offenders in New Zealand, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCES: PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY 
AND PRACTICE 88 (Jim Hudson et al. eds., 1996). 
 76. Inge Vanfraechem, Hergo in Vlaanderen (FGC in Flanders) (2003) (unpublished 
research report) (on file with Leuven, Onderzoeksgroep Jeugdcriminologie K.U.Leuven). 
 77. IVO AERTSEN ET AL., REBUILDING COMMUNITY CONNECTIONS—MEDIATION AND 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN EUROPE (2004). 
 78. DIGNAN, supra note 48, at 137–39, 145; SHERMAN & STRANG, supra note 28, at 62; 
STRANG, supra note 73, at 133. 
 79. SHERMAN & STRANG, supra note 28, at 62–64. 
 80. DIGNAN, supra note 48, at 141–42; Heather Strang et al., Victim Evaluations of Face-
To-Face Restorative Justice Conferences: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 
281, 292–301 (2006). 
 81. See Inge Vanfraechem & Lode Walgrave, Restorative Conferencing in Belgium: Can 
It Decrease the Confinement of Young Offenders?, 66 CORRECTIONS TODAY 72 (2004). 
 82. Kathleen Daly, A Tale of Two Studies: Restorative Justice from a Victim’s 
Perspective, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: ISSUES, PRACTICE, EVALUATION 
153, 159 (Elizabeth Elliott & Robert Gordon eds., 2005). 
 83. GABRIELLE MAXWELL ET AL., ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE OUTCOMES IN YOUTH JUSTICE 
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court.
84
 Most of the dissatisfied victims had been involved in poorly 
monitored conferences.
85
 Hence, deeper research must explore the 
complicated balance of possible benefits and risks for victims in 
restorative justice processes. It should also be influenced by social, 
psychological, and clinical insights into victimization and coping 
processes.
86
 Such research would not only reveal the positive side of 
restorative justice for victims but also point to a number of risks of 
involving certain victims of certain offences too enthusiastically in 
restorative justice processes. 
Our conclusion must remain provisional and cautious. The high 
satisfaction scores may hide risks for some victims. Moreover, we 
must remember selection biases. The scores are gathered from a 
selected group, i.e. those who were prepared to participate. One can 
expect that satisfaction would be lower among those not 
participating. In addition, victims in restorative justice processes meet 
with an offender who has already confessed.
87
 That is certainly not 
always the case in court sessions. The confession of the offender is 
crucially important for the victim’s feelings.88 Therefore it appears 
that only those victims who are willing to participate have truly good 
chances of not being disappointed. There are also indications to 
suggest that many of those who did not participate would have been 
more satisfied if they had.
89
  
OFFENDERS 
Among offenders, the willingness to participate in a restorative 
process is also high. For example, Strang et al. list participation rates 
between 58 and 100 percent in their survey of several conferencing 
 
158 (2004), available at http://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-
resources/research/youth-justice. 
 84. DIGNAN, supra note 48, at 145. 
 85. STRANG, supra note 73, at 151. 
 86. Pemberton, Winkel & Groenhuysen, supra note 64. 
 87. Daly, supra note 82, at 167. 
 88. Id. 
 89. In the Belgian project, the outcomes of the conference were presented to eleven of the 
non-participating victims. Nine of them called the outcome ―just‖ or ―very just,‖ and seven of 
them found that ―maybe they should have participated.‖ Vanfraechem, supra note 76.  
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applications.
90
 Here as well, the quality of the preparatory process is 
important, and the offender will also weigh the risks included against 
the possible benefits for him/her in participating.
91
 Probably many of 
them simply hope to come out better that way than if they went to 
court. That is not necessarily a problem. As long as it does not lead to 
secondary victimisation for the victims, one can realistically expect 
and accept that the offender begins a meeting with some calculation. 
We would all do the same. We shall see that the process during the 
meeting itself makes most offenders understand the harm they caused 
and become increasingly emotionally involved and less rationally 
calculating.
92
 
Satisfaction rates among offenders are very high. Bonta et al. 
mention an average expression of satisfaction of 87.7 percent.
93
 
McCold found more feelings of fairness and satisfaction in the 
programs characterized by the highest degree of stakeholder 
participation.
94
 He also found that the correlation between victim 
satisfaction and offender satisfaction was high, which seemed to 
achieve the pursued win–win situation.95 
REOFFENDING 
As reoffending is a peculiar subject of great public interest, it is a 
matter for a separate sub section. ―Evaluating a new paradigm by the 
criteria of the old paradigms is inappropriate.‖96 Restorative 
interventions are not a new treatment program. They express another 
paradigm, in which repairing the harm is the primary objective. 
While reoffending is not the first concern of restorative justice, the 
bottom line is, as argued before, that restorative justice interventions 
should not provoke more recidivism than traditional interventions.  
Despite the methodological shortcomings mentioned, some 
general conclusions can be drawn. Clearly, the available results do 
 
 90. Strang et al., supra note 80, at 291. 
 91. Kirkwood, supra note 60, at 116. 
 92. See infra notes 114–23 and accompanying text. 
 93. Bonta et al., supra note 28, at 114. 
 94. McCold, supra note 28, at 85. 
 95. Id. at 94–95. 
 96. Id. at 95. 
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not lead to triumphant conclusions regarding reoffending. Sherman 
and Strang, for example, conclude their survey of randomized 
controlled trials that the (mostly police-led) conferences significantly 
reduced repeat offending among violent offenders under thirty years 
of age in Canberra but produced little or no difference among violent 
males under eighteen years in Northumbria.
97
 A significant reduction 
was found among male property offenders under eighteen in 
Northumbria, but little or no difference among property offenders 
under eighteen in Canberra.
98
 
A few restorative justice schemes seem to increase reoffending 
compared to traditional criminal justice sentencing.
99
 It is not always 
clear why, but some hypotheses can be advanced. Sherman and 
Strang, for example, noted more re-arrests among young Aboriginals 
for property offenses in Canberra and refer to comparable (but 
statistically non-significant) observations among young Hispanics in 
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
100
 My hypothesis is that the increases were 
a direct consequence of the police facilitation of the conference. If 
ethnic minorities have poor relations with police, which is often the 
case, police-led conferences may provoke more defiance than 
compliance. 
Bonta et al. used methodological requirements to select 39 studies 
of restorative justice programs, broader than just conferencing, for 
meta-analysis.
101
 The overall effect was about a seven percent lower 
rate of repeat offending, compared with traditional criminal justice 
handling of cases.
102
 There was little variation in the mean effect 
across samples (adults/juveniles) and types of intervention.
103
 Studies 
published after 1996 reported greater effects than those published 
earlier, and Bonta et al. attributed this to the higher intrinsic quality 
of the projects.
104
 The schemes yielded little effect if they were 
 
 97. SHERMAN & STRANG, supra note 28, at 22. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See LATIMER, DOWDEN & MUISE, supra note 28, at 14–16. 
 100. SHERMAN & STRANG, supra note 28, at 22. 
 101. Bonta et al., supra note 28, at 112–13. 
 102. Id. at 114. 
 103. Id. at 115. 
 104. Id.  
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contextualized within criminal justice sanctions.
105
 Those outside the 
criminal sanction system produced up to 10 percent reduction.
106
 
Better results were achieved in programs targeting mostly violent 
offenders,
107
 which is in line with other outcomes reported for violent 
crimes
108
 and serious crimes.
109
 This is paradoxical when one 
observes that conferences are applied mostly to divert rather benign 
youth offences from court. Better effects are also observed with low-
risk offenders (violent offenders do not necessarily have a higher risk 
of reoffending). 
Retrospective studies confirm that the best predictor of 
reoffending is not whether there is a conference but rather prior 
offending and life experiences and the social prospects of the young 
offender.
110
 One can indeed imagine that a single intervention may 
have more influence on a young person who still has intensive bonds 
to social life than one who has drifted far away from social norms 
and values. It is probably in the same sense that we must understand 
why more young offenders desist after conferencing than older 
ones.
111
 
Many of the above-mentioned studies and surveys compare 
restorative justice practices as a whole with current criminal justice. 
They do not differentiate sufficiently among the various modalities 
and versions, while there is clear evidence that the quality of the 
conference matters.
112
 ―Good outcomes depend on good practice,‖ 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 116. 
 108. JOANNA SHAPLAND ET AL., DOES RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AFFECT RECONVICTION? 
THE FOURTH REPORT FROM THE EVALUATION OF THREE SCHEMES 41 (2008); LAWRENCE W. 
SHERMAN, HEATHER STRANG & DANIEL J. WOODS, CTR. FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, AUSTL. 
NAT’L UNIV., RECIDIVISM PATTERN IN THE CANBERRA REINTEGRATIVE SHAMING 
EXPERIMENTS (RISE) 3 (2000); Hennessey Hayes, Assessing Reoffending in Restorative Justice 
Conferences, 38 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 77, 92 (2004).  
 109. Lawrence Sherman, Reason for Emotion: Reinventing Justice with Theories, 
Innovations, and Research, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 19–20 (2003). 
 110. MAXWELL ET AL., supra note 83, at 199–215; Hennessey Hayes & Kathleen Daly, 
Conferencing and Re-offending in Queensland, 37 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 167, 177–
78 (2004). 
 111. Id. at 179. 
 112. Hennessey Hayes & Kathleen Daly, Youth Justice Conferencing and Reoffending, 20 
JUST. Q. 725, 747 (2003); MAXWELL ET AL., supra note 83, at 214, 215. 
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Maxwell summarizes.
113
 Shapland et al. found a significant relation 
between less reconviction and the adult offenders’ appreciation of the 
conference (the offender realized the harm done, the offender was 
actively involved in the conference, and the offender felt the 
conference was useful).
114
 Less reoffending occurred after family 
group conferences that were experienced as ―fair, forgiving, allowing 
them to make up for what they have done and not stigmatizing or 
excluding them.‖115 When the offender expressed remorse and a 
consensus was reached, conferences were more effective.
116
 It is not 
clear, however, whether remorse is provoked by the quality of the 
conference or is part of a compliant attitude of the offender which 
existed prior to the conference. ―[W]here offenders have decided to 
try to stop offending, a conference can increase motivation to desist 
(because of what victims and offender supporters said) and provide 
the support offenders may need to help tackle problems relating to 
their offending.‖117 
An important element is the follow-up after the conference. If the 
conference is followed by systematic support or treatment for the 
offender, the risk of recidivism is much lower.
118
 A well-conducted 
conference is an excellent opportunity to start such support. Daly 
found, for example, that sexual offenders were more likely to accept 
treatment after a conference than when they had been given a 
punitive sentence.
119
 Programs that also include social support and 
assistance with job placement seem to be much more successful than 
others.
120
 ―It may not be the role of restorative justice facilitators to 
deliver treatment programming; yet it would be useful if they would 
 
 113. Gabrielle Maxwell, The Youth Justice System in New Zealand: Restorative Justice 
Delivered Through the Family Group Conference, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND PRACTICES IN 
NEW ZEALAND: TOWARDS A RESTORATIVE SOCIETY 45, 65 (Gabrielle Maxwell & James H. 
Liu eds., 2007). 
 114. SHAPLAND ET AL., supra note 108, at 40–41. 
 115. MAXWELL ET AL., supra note 83, at 214. 
 116. GABRIELLE MAXWELL & ALLISON MORRIS, UNDERSTANDING REOFFENDING (1999); 
Hayes & Daly, supra note 112, at 756. 
 117. SHAPLAND ET AL., supra note 108, at iv. 
 118. MAXWELL ET AL., supra note 83, at 214–15. 
 119. Kathleen Daly, Restorative Justice and Sexual Assault: An Archival Study of Court 
and Conference Cases, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLGY 334, 351 (2005). 
 120. MORRIS JENKINS & GORDON BAZEMORE, OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR., STATE OF 
OHIO CITIZENS CIRCLE FORMATIVE EVALUATION (2006). 
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recognize the need for treatment and the type of programming that 
would assist in reducing offender recidivism, and make the 
appropriate referrals for treatment.‖121 This is not contradictory to 
restorative justice objectives but may be seen as complementary to 
them. 
All in all, the results regarding reoffending are complicated and 
sometimes contradictory. Restorative justice interventions are not a 
magic potion to eliminate recidivism. There is a tendency to reduce 
reoffending, but a few studies report an increase. One of the main 
reasons for the confusion may be the lack of differentiation in the 
independent variables. Restorative practices differ in the technical 
quality of the facilitating process, in the type and version of practices, 
in the (absence of) judicial context, in target groups, etc.
122
 All these 
variants may influence outcomes, including reoffending. For 
example, one cannot deliver recommendations on restorative justice 
for ethnic minorities in general on the basis of data from police-led 
conferences only. Equally, there are reasons to believe that the 
characteristics of family group conferencing in its original New 
Zealand context are more appropriate for serious offenses than the 
police-led diversionary conferencing schemes. 
FROM ―WHAT WORKS‖ TO ―WHAT HELPS‖ 
Parker concludes that there is no proof that restorative justice 
reduces recidivism.
123
 He points to the so-called ―what works‖ 
research to indicate what should be done. ―What works‖ refers 
mainly to a series of meta-analyses of earlier evaluations of treatment 
and prevention programs, aimed at identifying the characteristics that 
might be effective in reducing recidivism.
124
 Bonta et al., for 
example, list three principles for effective rehabilitation: (1) the 
intensity of the intervention must be in proportion to the offender’s 
risk of reoffending; (2) the programs must target the direct 
criminogenic needs, rather than indirect non-criminogenic needs; (3) 
 
 121. Bonta et al., supra note 28, at 117. 
 122. See generally McCold, supra note 28. 
 123. Richard Parker, Restorative Justice: Why Doesn’t It Work in Reducing Recidivism?, 
Paper presented at the 7th International Conference on Restorative Justice (Feb. 2005). 
 124. Id. 
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the program must be tailored to the learning style of the individual.
125
 
Behavioral-cognitive programs that appeal to the active responsibility 
of the offender are more effective than other treatment or punitive 
approaches.
126
 No program is infallible. The reductions in reoffending 
are always limited and depend on the kind of the intervention, 
characteristics of the target groups, and many factors beyond the 
scope of the programs.
127
 In fact, the ―what works‖ tradition should 
be renamed as ―what may work.‖ 
Actually, restorative justice practices do offer an excellent basis 
for implementation of the principles just listed.
128
 Well-conducted 
restorative mediations and conferences focus on direct relational 
needs, go straight to the crime and its consequences, appeal to the 
offender’s active responsibility, and offer a cognitive reparation 
experience in a no-nonsense, well-structured way that is perfectly 
understandable for all participants.
129
  
One principle deserves special attention. According to Bonta et al. 
the intensity of the intervention must be in proportion to the 
offender’s risk of reoffending.130 Most evaluations have measured the 
reoffending after the restorative meeting, in isolation from the after-
care.
131
 It may be naïve to expect that a conference of a few hours 
could on its own change a life course that is sometimes going wrong 
from birth. But the meeting is an excellent opportunity to begin 
treatment and other social support afterwards.
132
 A well-conducted 
restorative encounter offers, more than the traditional judicial 
procedure, an opportunity for the offender and his family to 
recognize that things are going wrong and should change.
133
 They 
 
 125. Bonta et al., supra note 28, at 111–12. 
 126. James McGuire & Philip Priestly, Reviewing ‘What Works:’ Past, Present and Future, 
in WHAT WORKS: REDUCING REOFFENDING 3, 16 (J. McGuire ed., 1995). 
 127. Friedrich Lösel, It’s Never Too Early and Never Too Late: Towards an Integrated 
Science of Developmental Intervention in Criminology, THE CRIMINOLOGIST (Am. Soc’y of 
Criminology, Cleveland, OH), Sept./Oct. 2007, at 1, 3–6. 
 128. Gordon Bazemore & Dee Bell, What Is the Appropriate Relationship Between 
Restorative Justice and Treatment?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 119 (Howard 
Zehr & Barbara Toews eds., 2004). 
 129. Id. at 123–28. 
 130. Bonta et al., supra note 28, at 111. 
 131. See supra notes 96–122 and accompanying text. 
 132. See supra notes 129–55 and accompanying text. 
 133. See BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 47, at 216. 
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may be more ready to accept treatment afterwards. For the 
reoffending issue, the quality of the follow-up is at least as important 
as the conference itself
134
 and should be included in the evaluation 
studies. 
Despite the partial congruence of restorative justice practices with 
treatment in the ―what works style,‖ a profound contradiction 
subsists. Whereas restorative justice views the offender as a moral 
agent, capable of taking responsible and constructive options if the 
adequate conditions are fulfilled, the ―what works‖ approach takes 
such view much less evidently. ―What works‖ sees the offender 
mainly as a bearer of risks and examines what kind of treatment is to 
be applied to him. The offender is viewed as the passive object of the 
intervention, like the machine to be repaired is viewed by the 
engineer. 
In that respect, the Good Lives Model in offender rehabilitation, 
as presented by Ward and Maruna, is more in line with the restorative 
justice philosophy.
135
 The Good Lives Model ―begins from the 
assumption that offenders are essentially human beings with similar 
needs and aspirations to nonoffending members of the 
community.‖136 The best possible tool for offender rehabilitation is 
the offender’s motivation.137 ―Yet, without their support, no one will 
ever save rehabilitation.‖138 The great majority of offenders aspire to 
leave their socially marginalized lifestyle and to become respected 
law abiding citizens, but many of them are unable to make that turn 
on their own.
139
 Without a realistic hope that the aspiration can come 
true, they will not commit themselves into an enduring effort to 
surpass the crime-prone situation.
140
 Appropriate help can foster such 
hope. That is why Ward and Maruna recall their approach ―what 
helps‖ instead of ―what works.‖141 Restorative justice fits well in this 
 
 134. See Bazemore & Bell, supra note 128, at 125. 
 135. TONY WARD & SHADD MARUNA, REHABILITATION: BEYOND THE RISK PARADIGM 
107 (2007). 
 136. Id. at 24. 
 137. Id. at 176. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 15. 
 140. Id. at 126–27. 
 141. Id. at 12. 
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view.
142
 A restorative process is an opportunity for the offender to 
discover positive ways of being somebody. Being offered the 
possibility to make up for the harm caused and to feel respect for that 
is a crucial element for changing self-image and public image in a 
positive way.
143
 It may open the window on a more socially 
integrated future, and thus be a major motivation in the offender’s 
quest for rehabilitation. 
Still, having an impact on the offender is not the primary aim of 
restorative justice programs, though it can be a part of the ―balanced‖ 
reparative goal.
144
 Even if research on restorative justice does not 
unambiguously demonstrate that it always reduces reoffending 
considerably,
145
 the overall results are encouraging. The participation 
rate is higher than skeptics would expect; victims and offenders 
report that they are better off after such a process; and there is 
evidence that recidivism is not worse.
146
 And that is what matters in 
the coherent restorative justice approach. How can these results be 
explained? The next section examines the possible theoretical 
understandings of a restorative justice process. 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO RESTORATIVE PROCESSES 
At first sight, a constructive meeting between a victim and an 
offender is not evident. Victims and offenders seem by definition to 
be opponents. The current hardening of social life probably does not 
make things easier in that respect.  
Yet, restorative justice philosophy rests on a belief that, despite 
their contrasting roles and initially contradictory views of the 
incident, victims and offenders have reasons to be motivated to try to 
find a constructive solution. And it happens, indeed. If the 
 
 142. John Blad, Criminal Justice Without Threats, in SECURITY, NODAL GOVERNANCE 
AND JUSTICE UNDER THE RULE OF LAW (2010). 
 143. Gordon Bazemore & Shadd Maruna, Restorative Justice in the Reentry Context: 
Building New Theory and Expanding the Evidence Base, 4 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 375, 379 
(2009). 
 144. Bazemore & Bell, supra note 128, at 119, 120–21; Gordon Bazemore & Sandra 
O’Brien, The Quest for a Restorative Model of Rehabilitation: Theory-for-Practice and 
Practice-for-Theory, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LAW, supra note 14, at 31, 31–32.  
 145. See supra notes 96–122 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 77–89, 96–122 and accompanying text. 
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appropriate conditions are shaped, both victims and offenders are 
brought to understand that they share interest in an authentic 
dialogue, in view of a constructive settlement and the social peace it 
facilitates. How can that be explained? It brought me to advance the 
paradoxical concept of ―common self-interest.‖147 
THEORETICAL MODELS 
So far, most research on restorative justice has tried to find out 
whether such processes work, rather than why or how they may work. 
Evaluation research on restorative justice practice oriented by 
theoretical presuppositions is relatively scarce. From the rich fund of 
theories of human and criminal behavior and its treatment, some 
hypotheses can be advanced to speculate about why and how 
restorative justice might work as it does. This section presents a 
selection of the most prominent visions. 
First of all, restorative justice processes avoid some deficiencies 
inherent in penal justice. Communication in traditional criminal 
justice is poor. The formalized settings and the threat of punishment 
make authentic communication of what happened almost impossible. 
This reduces the potential for a positive impact on the stakeholders 
dramatically. Restorative justice processes, on the contrary, offer 
ample potential for authentic communication. Sherman contrasted his 
defiance theory against the traditional deterrence expectations in 
classical penal theories.
148
 In his view, the extent to which offenders 
experience sanctions as arbitrary or illegitimate will affect their 
resistance against the authorities that imposed the sanctions.
149
 The 
day-to-day functioning of the criminal justice machine provokes 
defiance rather than compliance.
150
 
Among the more positive theoretical explanations as to why and 
how restorative justice processes function as they do, reintegrative 
shaming is probably the most popular one.
151
 The core of it is, in 
 
 147. WALGRAVE, supra note 2, at 104–14. 
 148. Lawrence Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal 
Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 445 (1993). 
 149. Id. at 461–65. 
 150. Id. at 465–66. 
 151. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 36:91 
 
 
Braithwaite’s words, ―(1) that tolerance of crime makes things worse; 
(2) that stigmatization, or disrespectful, outcasting shaming of crime, 
makes crime worse still; and (3) that reintegrative shaming, or 
disapproval of the act within a continuum of respect for the offender 
and terminated by rituals of forgiveness, prevents crime.‖152 If 
shaming is stigmatising, as in most court interventions, the risk is 
psychosocial identification with non-conformism and further 
offending.
153
 If, on the contrary, shaming is focused on the behaviour 
and not on the person and is followed by gestures of reacceptance, it 
is a powerful emotion that can lead to desistance.
154
 This theory was 
boosted in criminology in the 1990s, and has been predominant in the 
restorative justice literature.
155
 Restorative conferences were seen as 
an ideal scene of ―successful reintegration ceremonies.‖156 
Since then, several criticisms have challenged the original version 
of the theory.
157
 The centrality of the shame emotion in restorative 
encounters has been nuanced and completed. Other (moral) emotions 
and dynamics, such as guilt, remorse, and empathy, seem to play an 
equally important role.
158
 
It has been recognized that shame, as such, does not necessarily 
lead to compliance.
159
 Being subjected to a shaming experience can 
lead to reintegrative gestures but also to disintegrative reactions.
160
 It 
 
 152. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 74 
(2002). 
 153. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 151, at 55, 102–03. 
 154. Id. at 55. 
 155. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 152, at 74. 
 156. John Braithwaite & Stephen Mugford, Conditions of Successful Reintegration 
Ceremonies, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 139, 139–40 (1994). 
 157. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 152, at 79. 
 158. Jacques Faget, Reintegrative Shaming: À Propos de la Théorie de John Braithwaite, 
LES CAHIERS DE LA JUSTICE 59 (2006); Susanne Karstedt, Emotions and Criminal Justice, 6 
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 299, 311–12 (2002); Allison Morris, Shame, Guilt and Remorse: 
Experiences from Family Group Conferences in New Zealand, in PUNISHING JUVENILES: 
PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 157, 169–74 (Anthony Duff & Ido Weijers eds., 2002); Bas Van 
Stokkom, Moral Emotions in Restorative Justice Conferences: Managing Shame, Designing 
Empathy, 6 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 339, 341, 347–50 (2002); Lode Walgrave & Ivo 
Aertsen, Reintegrative Shaming and Restorative Justice: Interchangeable, Complementary or 
Different?, 4 EUR. J. CRIMINAL POL’Y & RES. 67, 70–71 (1996). 
 159. THOMAS SCHEFF & SUZANNE RETZINGER, EMOTIONS AND VIOLENCE: SHAME AND 
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 160. Id. 
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can provoke defiance, expressed through denial of responsibility or 
anger at the shamer.
161
 That is why later versions have elaborated on 
the concept: it is not shame as such, but ―acknowledged shame,‖ that 
is the constructive emotion which may lead to accepting 
responsibility and being prepared to comply. ―Shame 
Acknowledgement involves the discharging of shame through 
accepting responsibility and trying to put things right. The opposite is 
a resistance to accepting responsibility and making amends. Shame 
displacement means displacement of shame into blame and/or anger 
towards others.‖162  
Furthermore, reintegrative shaming theory originally was 
developed to orient the prevention of crime and reoffending. It 
focuses mainly on what happens to the offender. Because restorative 
processes are focused at least as much on emotional and other 
benefits to the victim, reintegrative shaming is too limited in scope. 
Some fear that programs relying too much on reintegrative shaming 
theory risk being less restoration-oriented and using the victims as 
―shamers‖ or ―props,‖ instead of focusing genuinely on the victims’ 
needs.
163
 
It is, however, difficult to avoid an offender feeling shame if he is 
personally confronted with the rejection of what he did, as in 
conferencing or mediation. To reduce the risk that shame remains 
unacknowledged, the social emotional climate of the experience is 
crucial. Here is where the theory of procedural justice comes in.
164
 
This theory opposes the punitive model of enforcing compliance with 
the law.
165
 The theory states that in their contacts with the police and 
justice system, people are more concerned with the way they have 
been treated than with the outcome of the procedure.
166
 Procedural 
 
 161. Id. at 127–30. 
 162. John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, Shame and Shame Management, in SHAME 
MANAGEMENT THROUGH REINTEGRATION 3, 12 (Elisabeth Ahmed et al. eds., 2001). 
 163. DIGNAN, supra note 48, at 117; Mark Umbreit & Howard Zehr, Restorative Family 
Group Conferences: Differing Models and Guidelines for Practice, 60 FED. PROBATION 24, 27 
(1996). 
 164. TYLER, supra note 44. 
 165. Tom R. Tyler, Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice: Dealing with Rule 
Breaking, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 307, 308 (2006). 
 166. Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of 
Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 669–73 (2007). 
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justice focuses on the subjective sense of being treated fairly with 
respect and equity, being taken seriously, and being listened to by the 
authorities.
167
 The basic assumption is that when people are treated 
with procedural justice, ―they view law and legal authorities as more 
legitimate and entitled to be obeyed.‖168 Procedural justice is crucial 
for belief in the system’s legitimacy, for both victims and 
offenders.
169
 It brings about a shift from the motivation to avoid 
punishment by an external power towards an internal motivation to 
comply with a legitimate authority.
170
 The characteristics of a 
restorative justice meeting offer better conditions for the stakeholders 
to feel such procedural justice than traditional court proceedings.
171
 
The empirical assessment so far confirms that both victims and 
offenders feel fairly and respectfully treated in a conference. It is 
probably the main reason why they acquiesce with the process and 
with what is agreed. It is a crucial (but not sufficient) basis for both to 
begin to (re)construct their lives as (re)integrated citizens. 
In addition to being treated fairly, the experienced support and 
confidence of loved ones provides a strong platform for a new start. 
Bazemore and Schiff refer to Cullen’s idea of social support as a 
crucial concept.
172
 Victims and offenders who can rely on ongoing 
relationships of informal control and support will benefit in a 
conference.
173
 These ―natural helpers‖ are empowered in a 
conference to provide ongoing guidance and assistance and to 
support healing and adjustment in the aftermath of the crime and the 
conference.
174
 The idea recalls Hirschi’s theory of social bonds, 
especially the attachment bond.
175
 There are indeed reasons to believe 
that a successful conference may help tighten social bonds, so that 
they are an informal social platform for reparation and for social 
reintegration afterwards. This is probably what Shapland et al. mean 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Tyler, supra note 165, at 308. 
 169. Id. at 312. 
 170. Id. at 311–13. 
 171. See id. at 316. 
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 173. Id. at 54. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See TRAVIS HIRSHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUINCY (1969). 
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when they write: ―where offenders have decided to try to stop 
offending, a conference can increase motivation to desist (because of 
what victims and offender supporters said) and provide the support 
offenders may need to help tackle problems relating to their 
offending.‖176 
If participants experience procedural justice, and feel supported by 
their informal network, shame can be acknowledged and can become 
reintegrative.
177
 For offenders, it may be the starting point for 
reconstructing their identity in a more socially conformable version. 
Maruna found that desistance from further criminality depends most 
on the opportunity to ―make good,‖ meaning to reform the 
conception of the self as a social-norm-compliant person.
178
 Sherman 
suggests that restorative encounters may facilitate such ―epiphanies‖ 
as he calls them.
179
 Maruna also presents restorative conferences as 
redemption rituals and sees the opportunity to repair what has been 
done wrong as a major chance to build a new identity.
180
 In terms of 
the Good Lives Model, a restorative justice encounter can be very 
helpful for the offender to turn the page and commence the way 
towards social rehabilitation.
181
 
Finally, as argued above, well monitored restorative justice 
processes offer an excellent context in which to implement the 
principles of effective correctional treatment, as advanced in the 
―what works‖ research tradition.182 
Except for the procedural justice theory, the theories mentioned so 
far focus mainly on the offender. Strang et al. advance a theoretical 
approach concerning the victim.
183
 Cognitive behavioural therapy 
indicates that ―victims may extinguish their fear by repeatedly 
reliving their trauma or confronting people involved in trauma in 
safety and far from the fearful place where the event occurred.‖184 
 
 176. SHAPLAND ET AL., supra note 108, at iv. 
 177. Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 162, at 39–57. 
 178. SHAD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD THEIR 
LIVES 9–10 (2001). 
 179. Sherman, supra note 109, at 13–14. 
 180. MARUNA, supra note 178, at 155–68. 
 181. WARD & MARUNA, supra note 135; Blad, supra note 142. 
 182. Bazemore & Bell, supra note 128. 
 183. Strang et al., supra note 80, at 285. 
 184. Id. 
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Moreover, cognitive behavioural therapy offers the victims an 
opportunity to be shown that they were not responsible for what 
happened to them.
185
 Restorative justice encounters obviously present 
a context wherein the victim can relive and confront the victimisation 
in a safe and respectful climate, which may help to reduce the post 
traumatic stress.
186
 
Not all interventions named as restorative are so evidently. 
Pemberton et al., for example, indicate some risks that may occur if 
victims are involved too thoughtlessly in restorative justice 
processes.
187
 Based on social psychology and trauma-based studies, 
they point to the importance of the extent to which victims perceive 
the event as being under control and whether they attribute the blame 
for what happened to themselves or to the offender and the risk of 
anger rumination and receiving insincere apologies.
188
 Practice and 
research on restorative justice programmes should draw more 
attention to these and other specific factors.  
To understand the socio-emotional dynamics of the restorative 
conference, Collins’ theory on Interaction Rituals may offer an 
interesting orientation.
189
 In this theory, interaction rituals are 
meetings characterized by four features: (1) participants are 
physically present and influenced by proximity; (2) participation is 
clearly defined as distinguished from non-participation; (3) all 
participants focus on a common target; and (4) all participants are 
moved by a common emotional mood.
190
 Restorative encounters 
clearly respond to these characteristics. Interaction rituals may 
provoke ―collective effervescence,‖ a high emotional intensity which 
drags the emotions to be focussed on the common goal.
191
 It can be 
applied to the intensive emotional dynamics in a restorative process 
and help to explain why they so often lead to constructive satisfying 
outcomes, including apologies and forgiveness. 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 286. 
 187. Pemberton, Winkel & Groenhuysen, supra note 64. 
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Not all processes do equally well. But there are ―few studies that 
help to identify best practices within categories of restorative justice 
programs.‖192 To orient such studies, a theoretical frame is developed 
for gauging the ―restorativeness‖ of the interventions. It is a 
normative construct based on restorative justice principles to 
establish program integrity.
193
 Victim-sensitivity is crucial in the 
construct.  
A SEQUENCE OF MORAL EMOTIONS 
Some sequential order can be suggested in the moral emotions 
that occur in a restorative justice conference.
194
 Typically, most 
offenders will begin the session with embarrassment, as they are 
exposed to possible blame.
195
 Many offenders also feel at the 
beginning some vague shame and guilt: they understand that they 
have misbehaved, disappointed their beloved persons, and caused 
trouble or harm.
196
 Most will hope to get through the process in the 
least uncomfortable way possible.
197
 Victims’ emotions at the 
beginning are linked directly to their victimization: the offense has 
caused harm and was humiliating.
198
 They feel shame and possibly 
embarrassment over the humiliation they have undergone but also 
want this suffering made right, because they know the intrusion was 
unjust.
199
 Victims probably hover between punitive retribution, a 
desire to inflict an equal humiliation and suffering on the offender, 
and restoration, a demand for reparation or compensation for the 
prejudices suffered.
200
 
 
 192. Gordon Bazemore & Diane Green, Yardsticks for Victim Sensitive Process: Principle 
Based Standards for Gauging the Strength and Integrity of Restorative Justice Intervention, 2 
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 193. BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 47, at 33. 
 194. Nathan Harris, Lode Walgrave & John Braithwaite, Emotional Dynamics in 
Restorative Conferences, 8 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 191, 199 (2004); WALGRAVE, supra 
note 2. 
 195. Harris, Walgrave & Braithwaite, supra note 194, at 199. 
 196. Id. at 200. 
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 199. STRANG, supra note 73, at 108–18. 
 200. Harris, Walgrave & Braithwaite, supra note 194, at 200. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 36:91 
 
 
These emotional starting points can orient the rest of the 
conference.
201
 The original unpleasant and disempowering feelings 
can provoke defiance in the offender, initiating a process towards 
unacknowledged shame. That can cause greater dismay and 
additional indignation in the victim and others, provoking escalation 
of the conflict, stigmatization, and secondary victimization.
202
 It is 
therefore crucial to create a secure climate of respect and fairness, to 
make sure that procedural justice is experienced from the beginning 
and support from the ―natural helpers‖ clearly felt.203 Many offenders 
will then be able to take a vulnerable position and accept 
responsibility. In such a climate, victims will also understand more 
easily that the conference cannot respond to their expectations from 
the very beginning. 
Then the victim tells his story of harm and suffering, fear and 
anger. The victim explains the suffering to which he has been 
subjected. Most offenders, confronted with that, will be touched by 
compassion and begin to sense the invitation to apologize. It is an 
important transformation. The initial shame, focused on one’s own 
discomfort under the regard of the other, will be completed by 
compassion, which is focused on the discomfort of the other. In our 
expectation, most offenders will not remain indifferent to the 
suffering of their victims, even if they were indifferent initially. 
Victims will appear to them as being more than ―an object with a 
handbag‖ or some anonymous owner of a car but a concrete human 
being with needs and emotions. If the conference goes well, the 
offenders will understand the suffering. 
But it is not only compassion they will feel. They will recognize 
that their behavior has caused suffering. The wrongfulness of their 
behavior now appears more clearly. Guilt may emerge, and its 
grounds become more concrete than at the beginning: the reason for 
the norm is clear and even emotionally felt. Moreover, offenders feel 
shame, especially because their wrong-doing is exposed to those who 
care about them and who are important to them. 
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This is crucial to the conferencing process. The ideal sequence 
relies very much on empathy to induce remorse or guilt and shame. 
The offender must recognize the suffering of the victim and accept 
responsibility for it. Both aspects can go wrong. Empathy in the 
offender for the victim’s suffering is possible only if the offender 
himself experiences empathy. If he is disrespected, he is likely to 
become fixed in a defensive, defiant attitude and to close his mind to 
the suffering of the victim.
204
 If he feels respect, despite rejection of 
what he did, and experiences that participants try to understand who 
he is and how he came to do what he did, he is more likely to open 
his mind to the suffering of the other. 
Still, shame and guilt are unpleasant feelings, which one wants to 
be relieved of. Acknowledging responsibility only adds to the pain. 
And that can also make things go poorly. The direct confrontation 
may provoke in the offender a defensive reaction, denying the 
suffering or rejecting the responsibility for it.
205
 But shame and guilt 
may also be accepted and resolved through acknowledgement and 
reparation. If the offender experiences support and gestures of 
reacceptance, he is more likely to risk a weak position and accept 
responsibility for what happened.
206
 To be relieved of the unpleasant 
feelings, the offender will then be inclined to make positive gestures 
in a restorative sense, including an apology. 
Apology is crucial in a restorative process.
207
 The offending act, 
the victimization, cannot be undone, but the very fact that the act has 
been committed and that it is unjust must be explicitly noticed.
208
 An 
apology, ―no matter how sincere or effective, does not and cannot 
undo it what has been done. And yet, in a mysterious way and 
according to its own logic, this is precisely what it manages to do.‖209 
 
 204. See Sherman, supra note 148, at 459. 
 205. See generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 151. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Bottoms, supra note 67, at 94; Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Effects of Face-to-Face 
Justice on Victims of Crime in Four Randomized, Controlled Trials, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 367, 388 (2005). 
 208. Bottoms, supra note 67, at 95–96. 
 209. Id. at 95 (quoting NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY 
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In an apology, the offender recognizes guilt.
210
 He expresses an 
understanding of the wrongfulness of the norm transgression and 
confirms his recognition of the victim as a bearer of rights. While 
recognizing guilt, the apologizing offender asks the victim to 
―ex-cuse,‖ literally to ―de-accuse‖ him, to undo him from guilt. The 
offender takes the vulnerable position by submitting to the victim, 
placing his fate in the hands of the victim. The victim may refuse or 
accept the apology, possibly under certain conditions. The roles are 
reversed now. Whereas the offender exercised power over the victim 
in the offense, it is now the victim who has the decisive power. The 
willingness of the offender to undertake material actions to secure 
restoration underlines the truthfulness of the apology and makes 
concrete the recognition of the harm he has caused.
211
 But still, the 
offense and the injustice done to the victim are not undone. It is as 
the novelist Ivo Andric writes: ―Injustice, once committed, can 
neither be corrected, nor annihilated. Attempts to rectify or remove it 
only create new injustices . . . . And if there were no forgiveness and 
forgetting, injustice would cover the world and turn it into Hell.‖212 
We must hope that the next step in the sequence is taken. It is 
facilitated by the offender’s apology. 
The vulnerable point at this turn is that the apology must be felt as 
being sincere. If the apology is experienced as a strategy by a 
calculating offender to get lesser sanctions, rather than as an 
expression of genuine regret and acceptance of guilt, the victim may 
feel betrayed again in his confidence and undergo some secondary 
victimization. 
In a successful sequence, when the apology seems to be honest, 
most victims now feel restored in dignity and in citizenship by the 
apology. The victim’s desire for revenge fades. Whereas revenge 
emotions are a drive to respond to humiliation by counter-
humiliation, there is no desire for this any more: the offender has in 
fact removed the humiliation through his apology. To a certain 
degree, he has ―humiliated himself‖ in the eyes of the victim. 
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Moreover, the offender’s apology is amplified by the other 
participants’ support, which adds to the vindication of the victim. At 
this stage, the basic empathy between all humans is activated also in 
the opposite sense, so that the victim can feel some sympathy for the 
offender. This opens the way to forgiveness and genuine dialogue. 
Forgiveness is more than accepting that the compensation is in 
balance with the harm suffered. It is a highly moral act to decide to 
put an end to the conflict, while the act and its consequences are not 
undone.
213
 Forgiving is a gift given by the victim to the offender, 
because it conveys to him the victim’s trust that he will restrain from 
causing further harm and opens hope for constructive relations in the 
future. It is also a gift from the victim to the community as a whole, 
because the community will benefit from the elimination of enduring 
conflict and unsettled accounts in its midst. Genuine forgiveness 
transcends self-interest and hope of reciprocity, because it is a one-
sided step, though it may lead to a better reciprocal dialogue.  
Yet, genuine apologies and true forgiveness cannot be primary 
objectives of restorative encounters. While they are favored by the 
context and the process, they may be beneficial effects, not explicit 
goals. If they were delivered under pressure or even ordered, they 
would lose their meaning. It is the fact of being offered freely as a 
gift that gives them emotional and relational strength. 
The offender’s public expressions of remorse and apology and his 
offer to make reparation also bring him respect, because he had the 
courage to face his responsibility and was willing to make reparation. 
The acceptance of the offer by the victim and the approval by the 
loved ones are expected to have an impact on his ethical identity. 
There is a chance that he will be able to leave the offense and its 
consequences behind him (after meeting the conditions) and that he is 
not fixed in the role of ―irredeemable criminal.‖ 
The whole process in a non-adversarial, respectful, and supportive 
climate may facilitate the offender’s and his family’s awareness that 
things have been going deeply wrong, and that something must be 
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Dumont, Le Pardon, une Valeur de Justice et d’Espoir, un Plaidoyer Pour la Tolérance et 
Contre l’Oubli, 42 REVUE CANADIENNE DE CRIMINOLOGIE 299 (2000). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 36:91 
 
 
done to stop the negative development. It may be the occasion to 
search actively for treatment or help or to accept such an offer. 
Of course, this outline represents an ideal situation. Reality is 
much more complicated and does not often lead to such happy 
ending. Each conference is different, depending on the nature of the 
crime, the people involved, the way the process is prepared and 
facilitated, and many other specific circumstances. Moreover, the 
outline has focused on the two main stakeholders only, victim and 
offender, whereas the impact by and on other participants is also of 
crucial importance. Despite strong recommendations to include 
parents and other members of the community of care in the 
encounters, research on their participation is scarce. But the outline 
may make it easier to understand the potential of restorative 
encounters to generate satisfaction and feelings of procedural justice 
among the participants and why they are more likely to comply with 
the agreements than after a judicial procedure. It also argues for 
recognition that parents may experience more respect and support, 
and feel empowered to take up their parenting tasks again; they may 
also be more open to seeking or accepting external assistance and 
treatment afterwards. 
The outlined sequence also points to the central importance of 
empathy as the gate-opener in the process. Empathy and compassion 
are indispensable ―intermediate emotions‖ to make guilt felt, 
triggering the rest of the process. Therefore, the contextual climate is 
crucial to make empathy possible. Empathy and respect are possible 
only if the person himself experiences empathy and respect. They are 
the key to understanding the communicative and interactive added 
value of restorative processes. The absence of such a supportive 
climate in the traditional criminal procedures makes it almost 
impossible for the offender to be open to compassion. The offender 
then gets locked into feelings of embarrassment and 
disempowerment, which favor unacknowledged shame and defiance, 
rather than open dialogue. 
A PARADOX 
Whereas we have noted a number of theories and arguments for 
why restorative justice should be more effective, the empirical 
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assessment so far does not confirm convincingly the expectations.
214
 
In particular, the theoretically based expectations with regard to 
reoffending are not clearly sustained by the available evidence we 
mentioned above. Why is that? Several explanations are possible. 
Theories may be too naive or too one-dimensional, practices may 
reflect poorly the theoretical promises, and the research projects may 
not be differentiated enough to focus on crucial factors and 
mechanisms. A combination of these elements is probable. 
Additionally, the most plausible explanation might be found in the 
Good Lives Model. This model states that there is not a magic 
treatment to rehabilitate the offender; rather, the motivation of the 
offender himself is crucial.
215
 To succeed in his rehabilitation efforts, 
the offender must be helped (by his ―natural helpers‖ and by 
professionals), and he needs a minimum of favorable social 
conditions and prospects.
216
 The lack of such help after the restorative 
encounter may be the main reason why restorative justice processes 
reduce reoffending less than might theoretically be expected. 
Although restorative processes may help the offender to find the 
appropriate motivation, most are afterwards left alone again to cope 
with the social conditions in their daily life. As stated already earlier 
in this Article: the follow up after the meeting is as crucially 
important as is the meeting itself.
217
 
INVESTIGATING THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
Crime is also a public event. Hence, another important question is 
whether the existence and (mainstream) implementation of 
restorative responses to crime would respond to public needs. 
Restorative justice proponents hold that it would contribute to 
building stronger communities, better than existing criminal justice 
practices do.
218
 They find arguments in the satisfaction rates among 
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community members participating in conferences, the (trend towards) 
decreased reoffending rates among offenders, the benefits for school 
communities and workplaces that have implemented restorative 
responses to norm transgressions, and to the few historical occasions 
on which restorative-like processes have influenced peacemaking in 
larger communities.
219
 The impact of restorative justice on a 
community is anticipated by the increasing community involvement 
in restorative practices.
220
 This is beneficial for cohesion within the 
community, which in turn improves informal social control and 
decreases feelings of insecurity. 
Counterarguments advanced are that, especially for serious 
crimes, there is a need to express the public indignation and anger 
about what happened, which must be canalized through a correct 
procedure and proportionate public sentence.
221
 Moreover, it is feared 
that restorative practices are too soft on crime, so that they do not 
have a sufficiently deterrent effect on offenders. It may provoke an 
increase in crime. 
PUBLIC NEED FOR PUNISHMENT? 
The public need for punishment is documented with empirical 
data, showing that the majority of respondents wish offenses to be 
punished.
222
 This is of course not surprising in a society in which 
punishing offences is presented as the clear and unique response to 
crime. It is not at all certain that the punitive tendency would persist 
if the public were better informed about other possibilities. 
There is data to indicate that public acceptance of restorative 
responses to crime is high. When reparative alternatives are included 
in the questionnaires and presented realistically, they attract a large 
percentage of public choice.
223
 As expected, the type of crime 
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influenced the degree of preference. Sessar, for example, found that 
in all cases, a majority of his lay respondents opted for the reparative 
options, mostly outside the criminal justice system (42.4 percent) but 
sometimes also inside the system (17.4 percent).
224
 Of those who 
opted for punishment on principle, only 21.4 percent chose the last, 
purely punitive, response.
225
 The modalities outside the judicial 
system were seldom chosen for burglary or rape, but even then, a 
large majority preferred reparative possibilities under judicial 
supervision.
226
 Notably, the possibility of reoffending did not change 
these preferences.
227
 Sessar concluded that ―the conception of the 
public’s strong punitive sentiments is a myth.‖228  
Based on a survey, Roberts and Hough concluded that ―[t]he 
public is unlikely soon to abandon the notion of punishment,‖ but 
they also found dissatisfaction about the traditional punitive system 
and support for ―more creative, non-carceral alternatives.‖229 They 
also write that ―[r]estorative (non-punitive) responses carry 
considerable appeal for the public, particularly for the young and 
non-violent offenders.‖230  
Actually, these results are surprising given that the public is 
constantly bombarded by the media and the authorities with the 
message that punishment is a ―natural‖ consequence of offending and 
given that the public is generally unfamiliar with the potentials of 
restorative justice. It may feed the suspicion that reparation after an 
offence is actually a more evident idea than the intentional infliction 
of pain after the offence but that this idea is suppressed by centuries 
of punitive apriorism. 
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PUBLIC SAFETY AT RISK? 
How systematic implementation of restorative justice would affect 
public safety cannot be answered by decisive empirical data. The 
main reason for that may be the absence of enduring and systematic 
implementation of restorative practices in particular communities, so 
that its impact on social life in general is hard to observe. 
The only tradition of systematic implementation of restorative 
justice schemes is found in New Zealand. In 1989, the Children, 
Young Persons and their Families’ Act introduced family group 
conferencing as the mainstream response for all serious youth 
offenses.
231
 While New Zealand, like most other developed countries, 
may have been suffering a wave of increasing intolerance and 
feelings of insecurity, the statistics on youth offending do not show 
an increase.
232
 On the contrary, Maxwell et al. calculated that the 
number of arrests fell from more than 8,000 in 1987 to less than 
2,000 in 1990 and then rose gradually to just under 3,000 in 2001.
233
 
The number of young offenders in court fell from 400 per 10,000 
young people in 1987 to fewer than 200 in 1990 and then rose to 240 
in 2001.
234
 The number of convictions fell from 1,318 in 1987 to 269 
in 1990 and 234 in 2001.
235
 The number of custodial sentences 
imposed by adults’ courts on waived youths fell from 295 in 1987 to 
104 in 1990.
236
 In 2001, there were only 73.
237
 I am inclined to call 
such developments beneficial for public safety. 
All in all, there is no empirical indication that the restorative 
justice option would be blocked by a general public punitiveness. 
While simplistic repressive outcries may sound the loudest in the 
media, it is far from evident that they are the mainstream. Such an 
attitude seems rather to be a myth, boosted by simplistic media and 
extreme-right politics. Moreover, the reduced experience with a 
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tradition of restorative justice response to crime so far does not 
indicate that this would be detrimental for safety and safety feelings. 
On the contrary, Kurki writes: ―Restorative justice processes carry 
great potential to turn incidents of crime into positive opportunities of 
creating new relationships, building communities, and strengthening 
grass roots democracy. The potential is as yet unrecognised by most 
criminal justice agencies and researchers, and as a result, largely 
unrealised and unstudied.‖238 
TOWARDS A SECOND GENERATION RESEARCH  
ON RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
Restorative justice increasingly is seen as another paradigm which 
will, on the longer term, deeply influence the mainstream response to 
crime. The option for restorative justice is first of all based on socio-
ethical options. The question asked here is whether the available 
empirical data support this restorative justice preference. The answer 
so far is yes. This Article has offered empirical reasons to believe in 
the potential of the restorative justice approach to crime. Not only is 
it desirable, it also appears also to be feasible. Reoffending rates are 
not worse after restorative justice processes, probably better.
239
 
Crucial benefits are that victims are significantly more satisfied and 
that offenders understand better what they have done.
240
 There are no 
indications that public safety and the sense of justice would decrease 
if restorative justice were implemented more systematically. 
Additionally, the restorative potential seems to be recognized by the 
public.
241
 
Hence, it is not surprising that restorative justice practices are 
spreading quickly, and in increasingly differentiated versions, all over 
the world.
242
 Restorative justice is developing, from an interesting 
track to be explored, towards a clear possibility or even an 
indispensable part of the mainstream response to crime. 
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But the empirical data must be read with care. Methodological 
inadequacies make most of the data illustrative, rather than 
conclusive. Most of the practices evaluated were restricted in size and 
scope, addressing mainly non-serious offences.
243
 Often, they are 
implemented in privileged circumstances. One must, however, not be 
too critical. Also the research into the effects of punishment, 
prevention, treatment, and social support programs suffers from 
methodological difficulties. Most evaluation projects must make do 
with research designs and measurements that are less rigorous and 
reliable than the ideal. Evaluating human interventions in human 
situations indeed does not occur in a laboratory. It is done in real life, 
and deals with an uncontrollable variety of real problems in real 
people and groups with particular interests, needs, and rights. 
Good restorative justice processes are based on coherent 
principles and rely on specific skills, but several restorative justice 
schemes exist with different reaches.
244
 They do not always work 
along strict scripts, and the intrinsic quality of the implementation is 
not guaranteed. They operate at different levels of the intervention 
and in a great variety of institutional, juridical and legal contexts, 
which may affect seriously the scope, the modes of operation, and the 
results. All this makes restorative justice processes seen as the 
independent variable subject to a huge variety of factors, dynamics 
and mechanisms. The dependent variable is equally diverse. The 
reparative objectives range from effects on the direct stakeholders to 
wide community reform, aim at immediate and long-term outcomes, 
and may be interpreted differently by the different stakeholders.
245
 
Some are core objectives, others are considered as secondary but 
meaningful benefits. Actually, not all possible dimensions and 
variants of independent, dependent and intermediate variables can be 
controlled in real life. That is why results of evaluation research 
always need to be read with realistic common sense. Empirical 
modesty must prevent the claim that the added value of restorative 
justice practices can be proved scientifically and beyond any doubt. 
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Such misplaced claims are seen all too often with regard to treatment 
programs. I have called them ―a kind of charlatanism.‖246 
Yet, further development of restorative justice must go hand-in-
hand with more and better research, moving beyond the blunt general 
question of whether restorative justice works or not. Critical 
empirical assessment of restorative justice practices remains the best 
possible safeguard to avoid restorative justice becoming part of 
―evangelical criminology: the fervour with which [restorative justice] 
is pursued . . . can blind its followers to its implications.‖247 
Restorative justice would degrade into a system based on belief, and 
the restorative justice movement into a sect of believers driven by a 
―crusading zeal.‖248 
After a first wave of projects that gave a rather unclear, but 
positive impression of restorative justice practice, it is time for a 
second generation of research that would ―increase the pixels‖ and 
refine the image of what restorative justice can achieve or not. It is as 
if one would examine whether treatment of offenders works or not. 
The initial rough ―nothing works‖ statement has been replaced by a 
more nuanced ―what works‖ question, providing more precise 
indications of elements of possible treatment success or failure.
249
 
Likewise, restorative justice research must become more nuanced and 
more focused.  
An increasing number of scholars are aware that future research 
should be more oriented by theoretical considerations.
250
 In fact, 
sloppy theorizing makes restorative justice often virtually unfit for 
accurate research. Much of the available research suffers from lack of 
clarity about what makes a series of practices being restorative, what 
their objectives are and what makes them to work as they (might) do. 
Theorizing must not only develop decent normative standards but 
also focus on possible explanatory models. It must orient empirical 
research on more focused hypotheses as to why restorative justice 
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works, under which conditions, and for what cases. It would lead to 
stronger research design and may yield sharper results. 
Refinement of restorative justice practice as the independent 
variable is absolutely necessary. Some programs enjoy the full 
support of justice professionals, but others must cope with 
indifference, skepticism, or even subversive boycott. A considerable 
variety exists in the type and seriousness of cases targeted or reached. 
Indirect mediation is not the same as face-to-face encounters. 
Mediation is different from conferencing. The New Zealand model of 
family group conferences differs considerably from other models, 
among which police led conferences are still very particular. A 
variety of procedures exist to select and train mediators or conference 
facilitators. Like in any profession, there are also among facilitators 
brilliant performers and bunglers. These and many other elements 
have systematic and deep consequences on the reach and the 
outcomes of the restorative justice practices. Moreover, the quality of 
the follow up after the encounter appears to be very important and 
should be included in the assessment of the independent variable. A 
few projects have included some differentiation between the 
examined restorative justice practices, but most do not.
251
 Even 
important research programs do not describe these variations and 
pretend to evaluate ―restorative justice,‖ as if all these nuances did 
not matter. They lose crucial information and offer results that are 
less significant than they would be if the independent variable were 
specified more accurately. 
The major strength in restorative practices clearly is its potential 
to favor a sequence of (moral) emotions leading to a kind of 
satisfaction in the participants. To understand these emotions, several 
theoretical models have been presented. But systematic empirical 
exploration is scarce. Mostly process outcomes have been measured, 
seeking answers to questions as ―has there been shame, remorse, 
guilt, empathy?‖ But if the sequence of emotions is so important, the 
process itself will have to be studied. They cannot be measured 
before or after the conference but must be observed during the 
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conference. Participant observation, including qualitative observation 
is needed to complete the quantitative data.
252
 
More nuanced research is needed on victims’ perception of 
restorative justice processes and their outcomes. Statistics indicating 
the benefits for victims hide a number of pressures and social, 
psychological, and clinical problems that may be caused by too pushy 
restorative justice approaches. Concerned victims’ advocates draw 
the attention to the fact that we do not know enough of the size and 
the kind of these problems.
253
 It must be taken seriously. If the 
paradigm shift of restorative justice is taken seriously, it is surprising 
in fact that evaluation research so far has focused more on the impact 
on the offender than on the victim. Logically, it should be the inverse. 
As restorative justice is mostly being implemented in the context 
of or mandated by the criminal justice system, more evaluation 
should address the relation between the restorative justice agencies 
and the criminal justice institution.
254
 For example, Bonta et al. found 
data to suspect that restorative justice schemes outside the system 
yield better results regarding reoffending than those inside the 
system.
255
 That finding deserves closer examination and explanation. 
It may have to do with the kind of cases dealt with, with the pressure 
the agencies undergo or other possible elements. 
The more restorative justice gains credibility and is accepted as 
being a part of the mainstream response to crime, the more urgent it 
is to reflect on how to fit it into an adequate legal frame. The basic 
issues are how to juxtapose informal processes with formal 
procedures, how to rely on communities while living in organized 
states, how to combine creativity and richness of the bottom-up 
approach with the clarity and strictness of the top-down approach, 
and how to prioritize voluntariness and compliance with possible 
coercion. The bottom line is respect for human rights and the 
children’s rights for juveniles.256 But if the paradigm-status of 
restorative justice is taken seriously, the traditional legal safeguards 
 
 252. Harris, Walgrave & Braithwaite, supra note 194, at 205. 
 253. Pemberton, Winkel & Groenhuysen, supra note 64. 
 254. Lemonne & Hydle, supra note 28. 
 255. Bonta et al., supra note 28, at 112. 
 256. See Nessa Lynch, Restorative Justice Through a Children’s Rights Lens, 18 INT’L J. 
CHILD. RTS. 161 (2010). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 36:91 
 
 
provided in the punitive systems cannot be reproduced. The values 
behind them, such as equivalence of all citizens and protection of 
citizens against abuses of power by fellow citizens or by the state, 
must be respected but made concrete differently. The construction of 
other legal principles must be considered, which would be more 
appropriate for the restorative perspective. Restorative justice 
literature on these questions is not abundant but increasing.
257
 It is 
one of the most important themes in deciding how far restorative 
justice will succeed in penetrating the mainstream response to crime. 
Finally, one must be aware that one single project cannot cover all 
versions, institutional and cultural contexts, dimensions, mechanisms, 
factors, and direct and indirect causal relations in restorative justice 
practice. It is far too diverse and uncontrollable. However, a 
comprehensive theoretical construction could locate all factors, 
dynamics, mechanisms, and elements—many of them 
interdependent—that may affect the empirical observations of 
restorative justice practice. It would allow recognition of the separate 
research projects and estimation of the degree and kind of the 
unavoidable methodological compromises. An outline of such 
construction has been proposed with four levels: (1) A description of 
the diverse legal and institutional preconditions in which restorative 
processes are carried out; (2) An observation of the practices 
themselves (which are broad and wide), including the particular 
potentials, limitations and risks of each; (3) A differentiated 
registration of the possible outcomes (These may have a broad range 
of aims related to different actors, different levels, and different time 
perspectives); (4) The conception of a research design with adequate 
control groups, in order to be able to attribute the possible outcomes 
to the intrinsic characteristics of the restorative practices rather than 
to other variables.
258
  
But even excellent and clearly positive restorative justice research 
would not lead directly to the expansion of restorative justice 
response to crime. Developments in criminal justice are a matter a 
criminal policy, which depends only partially on practical and 
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scientific qualities and options. The cultural and political climate is 
more decisive. While simplistic punitive outcries may sound the 
loudest in the media, it is far from evident that they really are the 
mainstream. There is no reason to be pessimistic about the future of 
restorative justice. Research can help to make a strong case for 
restorative justice, by holding the mirror for practice through 
constructive critical evaluation; by intensifying the link between 
theory, practice, and empirical research; and by juridical and 
philosophical reflection on the normative status of restorative justice 
in constitutional democratic states. 
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